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WORLD BANK: IssuEs oF INTERNATIONAL LAw AND Poucv. London and New 
York: Kegan Paul International, 1992. xvii + 295 pp. 
Reviewed by David A. Wirth • 
INTRODUCTION 
Defined as actions taken by member States that are "unrelated or 
inadequately related to the purposes and functions"' of a technically 
oriented intergovernmental organization, "politicization" as used in the title 
of this book is most definitely a pejorative. Following this definition, the 
World Bank becomes a paradigm for a phenomenon that threatens to 
"preoccupy and paralyze all of the specialized agencies,"2 consequently 
disrupting a functional view of the international order which "assume[s] 
that economic, social and technical problems can be separated from 
political problems and insulated from political pressures."3 
After asserting that the phenomenon of politicization can be identified 
by objective legal parameters, the author then engages in a painstaking 
proof of the proposition that the abuse of power by member States within 
international organizations like the World Bank- "politicization"- is 
unilateral economic coercion of borrowing countries, prohibited by 
international law. Finally, the book purports to demonstrate that certain 
practices related to the governance of the World Bank, such as political 
motivation in the exercise of weighted voting privileges and certain cases 
of direct instruction of Executive Directors by member country govern-
ments, are prohibited by the Bank's constituent treaties and international 
law generally. 
The principal contribution of this book, a publication of the Graduate 
Institute of International Affairs in Geneva,. is a series of factually 
oriented, carefully documented case studies. Three of these extended 
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l. BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD 
BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 14 (1992). 
2. /d. at 8. 
3. /d. at 15. 
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narratives receive especially close attention: (1) the give-and-take between 
the Bank and the United Nations over apartheid in South Africa and 
Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique~ (2) the Bank's 
lending policies toward the Allende regime in Chile against a background 
of disputes over the adequacy of compensation for governmental ex-
propriation of the property of foreign nationals~ and (3) an attempt in the 
late 1970s by the United States to preclude the use of its contributions to 
the Bank for loans and assistance to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos 
because the governments of those countries had been insufficiently 
responsive to inquiries concer:ning members of the U.S. military missing 
in action in Southeast Asia. Additionally, the book c~talogues and 
evaluates legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress intended to affect the 
Bank's policy toward its borrowers based on criteria such as.human ~ghts, 
narcotics, nuclear weapons, environ~ent, expropriation of foreign invest-
ments, competition with U.S. exports, and policies with respect to missing 
U.S. service personnel. The work not only collects these statutory man-
dates in one place, apparently for the first time, but also describes and 
analyzes the implementation of many of the legislative directives relating 
to U.S. participation in the World Bank. · · 
I. "POLITICIZA TION" AS INCONSISTENCY WrrH THE BANK'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOALS AND PURPOSES 
The major strength of this book, by its own terms, supposedly lies in 
giving legal content to a phenomenon that previously appears to have been 
defined and described primarily in political science terms. The author's 
chief measure of "politicization" is consistency with the Bank' s goals and 
purposes. The constitutional treaties for the primary constituent organiza-
tions that make up the World Bank examined in this book- the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ffiRDt and the 
International Development Association (IDA)5 - provide the main 
guidance for determining the aims of those two international financial 
institutions. The author understandably relies heavily on language in the 
mRD and IDA charters under the heading "Political Activity Prohibited" 
specifying that · 
The [international organization] and its officers shall not interfere 
in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced 
4. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Dec. 27, 1945,60 Stat. 1440,2 U.N.T.S. 134, amended by 16 U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929, 
(Dec. 16, 1965) [hereinafter IBRD Articles of Agreement]. 
5. Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, Jan. 26, 1960, 11 
U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter IDA Articles of Agreement]. 
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in their decisions by the political character of the . member or 
members concerned. Only economic considerations· shall be relevant 
to their decisions, and these consideratio.ns shall be weighed impar-
tially in order to achieve the purpos~s stated [in the relevant treaty].6 
689 
Based on these provisions, The United States and the Politicization of the 
World Bank then equates "political" considerations in the exercise of 
voting rights with "unrelated to the purposes of the World Bank." While 
hardly necessary, the book also goes considerably farther. The author 
asserts that failure by Bank member States to observe this standard in the 
exercise of their voting power may, under some circumstances, rise to the 
level of affirmative intervention by the Bank itself in the internal affairs 
of a borrowing country of the sort prohibited by the Charter of the United 
Nations.7 An alternative interpretation, not considered by the author, is that 
this provision is intended simply to remove the ·nature of the borrower's 
political character from the Bank's calculus.8 Whichever way one might 
be inclined to read this passage in the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the 
author's analysis never rises above the level of the tautological. Indeed, 
as he himself acknowledges, the test of consistency with the institution' s 
6. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. IV,§ 10, 60 Stat. at 1449, 2 U.N.T.S. 
at 158; IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. V, § 6, 11 U.S.T. at 2294,439 U.N.T.S. 
at 266-68; see also IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art.lll, § 5(b), 60 Stat. at 1444, 
2 U.N.T.S. at 146 (Bank shall oversee use ofloan proceeds "with due attention to considerations 
of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or 
considerations."); IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. V, § l(g), 11 U.S.T. at 2292, 
439 U.N.T.S. at 264 (Association shall oversee use of loan pro<;eeds "with due attention to 
considerations of economy, efficiency and competitive international trade, arid without regard 
to political or other non-economic influences or considerations."). 
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 2,1 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state."). · · 
8. The prohibitions on political activity in the IBRD and IDA charters were 
drafted by the British delegation to the Bretton Woods conference to be incorporated 
into the treaty establishing the IMF [International Monetary Fund] in order to placate 
the Soviet Union [which sent a delegation to the Bretton Woods conference but did 
not become a Bank member until1992 and 1993, when Russia and the former Soviet 
republics joined the Bank]. For various reasons, the clause was not inserted in the 
IMF agreement, but was incorporated into the IBRD charter in order to assure the 
Soviets and other communist countries that the Bank would not try to change their 
political systems. 
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 17 (1993). Echoing this theme, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, referring to the 
Bretton Woods Conference, stated that "[a]ll the discussion was on the economic and financial 
requirements of those countries .. .. [A]t no time was a question raised as to the political 
ideology of a country." An Act to Provide For the Participation of the United States in the 
lnternatioMl Monetary Fund and the lnternatioMl Bank for Reconstruction and Development: 
Hearings on H.R. 3314 Before the SeMte Comm. on Banking and Currency, 79th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 15 (1945). 
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principal objectives is not amenable to precise application, at least in some 
cases. 
Accordingly, a full inquiry into a particular act's "politicized" 
character requires the consideration not just of effect, but a subjective 
examination of "intentions ... [which] are fully as important as . . . ac-
tions."9 The author relies repeatedly on an advisory opinion in which the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded that opposition to the 
admission of States to the United Nations based on criteria other than 
those set out in the U.N. Charter is legally impermissible. 10 The ICJ' s 
advisory opinion expressly addressed only a situation in ·which the 
explicitly stated justification· for an action by a member State in an 
international organization conflicts with an exclusive list of acceptable 
reasons set out in that organization's organic treaty. As the author 
acknowledges, however, that opinion specifically does not address 
improper motives for which there is no objective evidence. In such a case, 
said the Court, "reasons, which enter into a mental process, are obviously 
subject to no control." 11 One way of looking at the lesson of this opinion 
is that votes in international organizations can be supported by even the 
thinnest rationale consistent with the aims of the organization in question. 
In the case of the World Bank, all that arguably would be necessary is a 
mildly plausible veneer of economic justification. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Bank's professional staff has been largely 
unsuccessful in embellishing this learning by enumerating impermissible 
political factors with precision. The author of this book documents 
statements from the early years of the Bank's history that identify 
conditions of political instability or uncertainty as economic factors 
relevant to the Bank's decisionmaking. A recent memorandum prepared 
by the Bank's General Counsel reinforces that linkage in the potentially 
very large and poorly defined category of cases in which political in-
stability, doubtful domestic security, political changes, partial or complete 
foreign occupation, or civil strife may acceptably be considered in the 
Bank's determination of creditworthiness. 12 One obvious consequence of 
this approach is the context-dependent flexibility that it leaves for the 
Bank's staff to define the terms "political" and "economic" in particular 
cases. 
9. BROWN, supra note I, at 229. 
10. Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United 
Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), 1947-48 I.C.J. 57 (May 28, 1948). 
11. /d. at 60. 
12. Ibrahim F.I. Shibata, The World Bank and "Governance" Issues in its Borrowing 
Members, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 53, 75-76 (Franziska Tschofen & 
Antonio R. Parm eds., 1991). 
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The author's own case studies ultimately demonstrate the profound 
difficulty in applying a test of motive in determining the validity of acts 
by and within an intergovernmental organization. These case studies and 
other factual data provided by the author support several generic con-
clusions. First, the Bank's professional staff is sufficiently insulated by 
the institutional structure of the international organization that it can resist 
political pressures, at least up to a point. On the other hand, institutional 
dynamics at the Bank can change at the insistence of donor country 
governments with the most clout in the institution because they give the 
most money and hold the largest number of votes. Moreover, the Bank's 
professional staff can - when it chooses or when it is compelled out of 
political necessity - link economic and political issues in a determination 
of creditworthiness that excludes purely political considerations. So, the 
Bank terminated assistance to Chile during the Allende period while 
denying a political motivation. 13 Similarly, then-World Bank President 
Robert McNamara promised to suspend lending to Vietnam for economic, 
not political, reasons. As The United States and the Politicization of the 
World Bank acknowledges, this overlap between "political" and 
"economic" considerations makes it very difficult to dissect and categorize 
a particular case after the fact either neatly or definitively 
Consequently, "politicization" is identified in this book.predominately 
through an inductive proces~ that relies on the case-by-case enumeration 
of empirical examples that the author chooses t~ characterize as animated 
by political goals. In attempting to craft a more precise legal test of 
"politicization," the author admits the arduous nature of 9etermining 
whether a State has deviated from obligations to refrain from impermis-
sible political behavior as defined, for instance, by the organic, constituent 
instrument of an international organization like the World Bank. 14 By 
contrast, ascertaining whether a State's rights have been affected by 
impermissible "politicization," as distinct from a State's failure to observe 
its legal commitments, is said to be more susceptible of identification from 
a legal point of view. As discussed below, the book's treatment of this 
latter question has serious analytical flaws. Moreover, definition of the 
term "economic," which characterizes those activities that clearly fall 
within the goals and purposes of the institution, receives scant attention. 
Consequently, the book largely fails to deliver on its cardinal pledge that 
"politicization can be defined not only as a political phenomenon, but as 
a legal phenomenon as well."15 
13. BROWN, supra note 1, at 161. 
14. /d. at 27. 
15. /d. at 7. 
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Perhaps some of the case studies involving clearer examples of 
political motivation, such as the cutoff of aid to Vietnam, can be explained 
by the author's analysis. Other cases present considerably greater difficul-
ties. For example, legislation mandating U.S. opposition to loans that 
might increase competition with U.S. agricultural exports, including palm 
oil, sugar, and citrus crops, is one of the most egregious examples of 
unilateral, protectionist self-interest described in the book. But while there 
might be other good reasons why this policy is poorly judged or even 
illegal, it does not fail for want of strictly economic motivation. From the 
point of view of this book, treatment of this legislation is further compli-
cated by its stated purpose·of "combat[ting] hunger and malnutrition and 
... encourag[ing] economic development in the developing countries."16 
The author makes rio attempt whatsoever to reconcile this stated intent, 
which is presumably consistent with the Bank's goals and purposes, with 
the operative effect of the statutory directive by describing a methodology 
that might be applied in other cases of incongruity between the two. 
Especially revealing is the author's praise for the "constructive"17 
efforts by the United States, the primary "politicizing" protagonist, through 
legislation adopted by the U.S. Congress and interventions from the 
Executive Branch, to improve the Bank's environmental performance. 
Unlike other instances of "politicization," this policy agenda is said to 
advance the interests of all Bank member countries, to conform to 
principles of multilateralism as demonstrated by the support of other 
members, and to enhance the Bank's fundamental economic mission. 18 By 
contrast, the author claims that similar U.S. laws designed to advance 
universal international norms for the protection of human rights, which 
have considerably deeper underpinnings in international law than virtually 
any multilateral standards for protection of the environment, are "primarily 
political rather than economic."19 
By distinguishing environment as virtually the sole example of apoli-
tical attempts by the United States to influence World Bank policies, the 
author reveals serious cracks in his intellectual edifice. He concludes, as 
he must, that "[t]he Bank should be able to adjust to changed cir-
cumstances ... , but this can only be brought about through the initiative 
16. 22 u.s.c. § 262g (1988). 
17. BROWN, .rupra note 1; at 237. 
18. See generally Shibata, .rupra note 12, at 135-80 (analysis by World Bank General 
Counsel in chapter entitled "The World Bank and the Environment-A Legal Perspective"). 
19. BROWN, supra note I, at 198. Cf. Shibata, supra note II, at 133 (statement by World 
Bank General Counsel that no balanced development can be achieved without the realization 
of a minimum degree of all human rights, material or otherwise, in an environment that allows 
each people to preserve its culture while continuously improving its living standards). 
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of the member states."20 His hollow efforts, however, to distinguish 
injurious "politicization" from "constructive" reform advocated by member 
States demonstrate the inherent futility of defining and identifying 
impermissible "politicization" in legal terms. For, however "constructive" 
and successful it may have appeared, the premises of the environmental 
reform campaign in large measure have been precisely the opposite of the 
principles espoused in The United States and the Politicization of the 
World Bank; 
This book treats environmental questions as technical, scientific, and 
methodological, and therefore related to the fundamental economic mission 
of the Bank in a way that human rights is not: Environmental activism, 
however, played a key role in the peaceful political revolutions in the 
countries of Eastern Europe, which are now targeted for a significant 
amount of World Bank lending in order to achieve environmental and 
other goals. More generally, the relationship between public participation 
in governmental decision-making processes - i.e., democracy - and 
environmental quality has now been firmly established at the highest level 
of universality as an international standard in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development,21 adopted by over 100 heads of State at 
the United Nations Conference and Development in June 1992. As such, 
environmental concerns in many cases have been the. thin end of the 
wedge for demands for greater public scrutiny and accountability of the 
actions of Bank staff and member country governments - a situation that 
is unlikely to be described as apolitical and in any event is not confined 
purely to the realm of economics. For similar reasons, U.S. policy on 
environment at the World Bank directly challenges the author's vision 
of technocratic decisionmaking by highly trained bureaucratic elites 
through 
20. BROWN, supra note l, at 237. 
21. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.l51/5/Rev.l (1992), reprinted in 31 l.L.M. 876, THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) 118 (Stanley P. 
Johnson ed., 1993), 3 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS 1617 (Nicholas Robinson ed., 
1992), 22 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 268 (1992), l REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 348 
(1992). Principle l 0 of the Rio Declaration provides as follows: 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public 
authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities [sic], and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. 
States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making 
information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceed-
ings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided. 
Rio Declaration, supra, princ. 10. 
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active and systematic encouragement of participation by borrowing 
countries['] nongovernmental environmental, community and in-
digenous peoples' organizations at all stages of preparations for 
country lending strategies, policy based loans, and loans that may 
have adverse environmental or sociocultural impacts; and full 
availability to concerned or affected nongovernmental and com-
munity organization[s], early in the preparation phase and at all 
subsequent stages of planning[,] of full documentary information 
concerning details of design and potential environmental and 
sociocultural impacts of proposed loans. 22 
II. "POLITICIZA TION" AS IMPERMISSIBLE INSTRUCTION OF 
NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO THE BANK 
Of necessity, The United States and the Politicization of the World 
Bank addresses the implications of structural and institutional considera-
tions in the governance of the Bank. One Governor, ordinarily that 
country's finance minister, represents each member State at the Bank. The 
Board of Governors meets as a body once a year and in practice gives 
only very general guidance to the Bank's professional staff. Twenty-four 
Executive Directors, appointed or elected by member country govern-
ments, represent member · nations in Washington on a day-to-day basis, 
have offices physically located in the World Ban~ complex, and approve 
staff proposals for individual loans. As in the case of the other major 
donor States of Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, the 
U.S. Executive Director represents no other member States. Other 
Executive Directors represent groups of countries, some of them quite 
curious. For instal)ce, one Executive Director represents the unlikely 
configuration of the Netherlands, Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, 
Israel, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. The individual generally 
identified as the Executive Director from Canada, a donor State, also 
represents most of the Caribbean countries, which are borrowers.23 
The Board of Executive Directors takes decisions by weighted 
majority voting. Votes are allocated according to a formula that depends 
on the number of a member State's shares and its capital contribution to 
the institution.24 So, among the 177 current IBRD members, the United 
22. 22 U.S.C. § 262m-S(b)(4), (5) (1988). 
23. See 1993 WORLD BANK ANN. REP. 232. 
24. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. V, § 3, 60 Stat. at 1451, 2 U.N.T.S. 
at 162; IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. VI, § 3, 11 U.S.T. at 2296-97, 439 
U.N.T.S. at 270. 
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States now exercises somewhat more than seventeen percent of the total 
voting power in the IBRD, nearly three times as much as the next 
largest shareholder, Japan. 
To some, the nature and scope of the Executive Directors' authority 
over the Bank's operations and its management and professional staff is 
somewhat unclear. Based on the text of the Bank's constitutional 
treaties,25 an opinion of the Bank's General Counsel asserts that member 
governments "are under an obligation not to influence the Bank's Presi-
dent and staff in the discharge of their duties, and Executive Directors 
are under the duty not to act as the instrumentality of members to exert 
such prohibited influence."26 
The author of The United States and the Politicization of the World 
Bank does not take such a categorical view. He notes that the negotiat-
ing history of the Bank's Articles of Agreement reflects not only this 
position, but also a competing view advanced by the United States and 
similarly accommodated by the text of the Bank's constituent instru-
ments. From this opposing perspective, the Executive Directors are 
subject to direct supervision by member country governments. Any 
ambiguity, however, has supposedly been removed because "the [sub-
sequent] practice of the Bank and its member states has reflected a 
clear but limited consensus to the effect that members are not to use 
their voting rights in that organization as a political tool for the pursuit 
of objectives unrelated to the Bank's purposes. ,m As a result, concludes 
the author, the Executive Directors "have what might be referred to as a 
political responsibility to defend the national interests of the govern-
ments they represent, but they also have responsibilities as members of 
an international organ. "28 Consequently, the activities of Executive 
Directors may reflect national positions, but only so long as instructions 
25. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
26. See Shihata, supra note 12, at 107 (quotation and analysis by World Bank General 
Counsel of his own internal memorandum). According to this view, the Bank's Executive 
Directors are "officers .. . of the Bank" who "owe their duty entirely to the Bank and to no 
other authority." IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4; art. V, § 5(c), 60 Stat. at 1452, 
2 U.N.T.S. at 166. Consequently, the Executive Directors are subject to the prohibition on 
"interfer[ing] in the political affairs of any member [and] be[ing] influenced ... by the 
political character of the member or members concerned" in the exercise of their voting rights 
because "[o]nly economic considerations shall be relevant to [the] decisions" of the Bank and 
its officers. /d. art. IV, § 10, 60 Stat. at 1449, 2 U.N.T.S. at 158; see also supra note 6 and 
accompanying text. The memorandum consequently concludes that "[t]he Chairman of the 
Board [of Executive Directors] is entitled to rule out of order a political debate or statement 
which does not have a clear relevance to the economic considerations related to the subject 
matter under discussion." See Shibata, supra note 12, at 46. 
27. BROWN, supra note 1, at 236. 
28. /d. at 108 (footnote omitted). 
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from the governments represented by those individuals are consistent 
with the goals and purposes of the Bank. Presumably the Executive 
Directors are then under a legal obligation to disregard impermissible 
attempts at instruction by member country governments for prohibited 
political purposes. 
Both the Bank's legal opinion and the author of this book ack-
nowledge that, at least in some cases, allegiance to the Bank requires 
Executive Directors to disregard the parochial interests of member State 
governments. On a practical level, this conclusion mirrors the central 
lacuna identified by this book: the absence of a meaningful test for 
distinguishing between permissible instructions on issues within the 
scope of the Bank's goals and purposes on the one hand, and improper 
"political" directives on the other. For the Executive Director represent-
ing the United States, this is a problem with immediate and pressing 
implications. As the author notes, it is no secret that the Executive 
Branch has routinely flouted prohibitions on direct instruction of the 
U.S. Executive Director, who until recently has held a concurrent ap-
pointment as a special assistant to the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury. 
More profoundly, the author's conclusion with respect to the ap-
propriate role of the Bank's Executive Directors raises very real ques-
tions of accountability. For, if the Bank's professional staff is subject to 
direction by the Board, and the Board's responsibility is strictly to the 
Bank as an institution, to whom is the Bank itself ultimately account-
able? Quite plainly, this functional perspective tends to attenuate 
seriously the authority of member country governments over the Bank' s 
professional staff. At the starkest extreme, accountability is the price of 
efficiency and efficacy. 
By comparison with the International Labor Organization and the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, both of 
which are cited as examples of undesirable "politicization," the World 
Bank is driven much more by the discretionary activities of its 
professional staff, which has considerable autonomy in achieving a clearly 
identifiable, operational, on-the-ground mission: lending very large sums 
of money.29 In the fiscal year that ended in the middle of 1993, the IBRD 
and IDA together approved 245 loans and credits totalling $23.7 billion,30 
many of which financed major development projects. If the author's 
criticisms were to be fully accepted, there is every reason to believe that 
a technocratic view of the world, in the case of the Bank founded on 
29. See Stephen Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organizations, 74 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 566, 589-90 (1980) (characterizing Board votes as legitimizing decisions made by staft). 
30. 1993 WORLD BANK ANN. REP. 167. 
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economics and economists, could be mobilized with limited or no 
accountability to governments or the public. The author of The United 
States and the Politicization of the World Bank acknowledges that the 
"Western liberal economic philosophy,''31 in which "political and economic 
or technical relations are fundamentally and rightly separable,"32 that 
serves as the foundation for the World Bank and other Bretton Woods 
institutions is not necessarily based on neutral, universally agreed prin-
ciples. Alternative views, however, are treated dismissively as "to some 
extent reflect[ing] Marxist thought."33 
Serious consequences of this Weltanschauung that are anything but 
Marxist are readily apparent from the point of view of the public in 
borrowing countries, the intended beneficiaries of Bank lending. To the 
extent that the activities of the Bank's professional staff are partially 
shielded from influence by member country governments, individuals and 
organizations that represent them may have no right to be consulted in 
decisions, such as the financing of large dams that displace thousands of 
people, that affect their very lives and livelihoods. While that situation is 
slowly changing, thanks to public criticism and efforts at reform from 
within and outside the Bank, the most effective mechanism for influencing 
the Bank is still through member country governments, most often those 
of donor States. 34 
Under these circumstances, one person's "politicization" may be the 
only route for another to achieve even a modicum of democratic represen-
tation in a highly technocratic setting. Public participation, in which 
official decisions are made after input from affected non-State actors, has 
assumed increasing prominence in recent years as a legitimizing factor in 
the activities of technocratically oriented international bodies like the 
World Bank, at least as a policy consideration if still perhaps not as a 
matter of customary internationallaw.35 Significantly, on the domestic 
level, the analogue of a strictly "functional'' approach has been rejected 
in favor of a structure in which public policy is shaped not only by 
technical considerations, but also by substantive goals. defined at least in 
part by overtly political considerations and direct public input into the 
regulatory process.36 
31. BROWN, supra note 1, at 23. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. 
34. See generally David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model 
for Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645 (1991). 
35. See, e.g., id. 
36. See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical 
Review, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501,546 (1989) (arguing that administrative process "should 
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Indeed, one could imagine a parallel book entitled "The Democratiza-
tion of the World Bank" that describes attempts to inject elementary 
principles of good government, such as access to information and oppor-
tunities for public comment, into the Bank's governance using many of 
the techniques dismissed as impermissible "politicization" in The United 
States and the Politicization of the World Bank. Precisely to fill this gap 
by assuring a measure of independent, objective oversight of the activities 
of its staff, the Bank's Board of Executive Directors recently created a 
new, independent Inspection Panel to which both governments and 
nongovernmental organizations may appeal the staff's failures to observe 
the Bank's own internal standards or Bank staffs inadequate supervision 
of the implementation of loan covenants by borrowers.37 Interestingly, the 
author identifies the very lack of access to Bank documentation as a prime 
cause of "hidden politicization,"38 but he engages in little reflection as to 
how this situation might be changed except by pressure from member 
country governments that itself might well be described as "politicized." 
The book is generally thin in its treatment of the real world dynamics 
that result from the organization of the Bank, the structure of the U.S. 
Government, and interactions between the two. Often acts or statements 
are attributed to the Bank as such, with little attention to the relationship 
between the Bank's professional staff and its Board of Executive 
Directors, which is crucial to a thorough understanding of the institution's 
decision-making processes and their potential for "politicization." The 
author barely attempts to distinguish political activities of Bank member 
country governments and the Executive Directors that represent them from 
the responses of the Bank's professional management to political 
pressures. When distinctions are made, the author pays very inordinate 
attention to the role of the Board while giving short shrift to how the 
Bank's professional staff exercises its considerable discretion. In the case 
study of a hiatus in lending during the Allende regime in Chile, for 
reflect democratic values and the intellectual contributions of democratic theory" notwithstanding 
the public's lack of technical expertise); Robert Reich explains: 
The job of the public administrator is not merely to make decisions on the public's 
behalf, but to help the public deliberate over the decisions that need to be made. 
Rather than view debate and controversy as managerial failures that make policymak-
ing and implementation more difficult, the public administrator should see them as 
natural and desirable aspects of the formation of public values, contributing to 
society's self-understanding. 
Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE 
L.J. 1617, 1637 (1985). 
37. See The World Bank Inspection Panel, l.B.R.D. Res. No. 93-1 0; I.D.A. Res. No. 93-6 
(Sept. 22, 1993) (copy on file with Michigan Journal of International Law). 
38. BROWN, supra note 1, at 240-42. 
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example, "politicization" appears to have been accomplished with barely 
a single negative vote from the U.S. Executive Director at the Board 
level.39 The author acknowledges in his conclusion that "the most effective 
politicizing actions are those which succeed in blocking loans before they 
are presented to the Bank's Executive Directors."40 He then throws up his 
hands, however, observing that "[w]here the politicizing influence is 
applied subtly and behind the scenes, it is more difficult to monitor and 
to regulate."41 
Likewise, much of the "politicizing" legislation must be read against 
a tug of war between the U.S. Congress and the Executive over the role 
of the United States in the governance of the Bank. While the author 
correctly observes that the Executive Branch, which is the point of contact 
for the U.S. Executive Director to the Bank, has been reluctant to serve 
as merely a transmission belt for implementing congressional policies at 
the Bank, this very important factor receives little additional attention 
beyond mere identification. So, for instance, the author observes that 
"[t]he US government has been notoriously unsuccessful in enlisting the 
support of other Bank members for its politically inspired 'no' vote 
positions"42 in the Bank's Board of Executive Directors as a result of 
legislative mandates. Hardly considered is the possibility that this 
phenomenon might result from a rote, as opposed to enthusiastic, im-
plementation of these congressional directives by the Executive Branch 
in which there is little or no desire on the part of the latter to secure the 
support of other Bank member countries. 
III. "POLITICIZA TION" AS UNILATERAL ECONOMIC COERCION 
The author of The United States and the Politicization of the World 
Bank goes on to identify "politidzation" as a violation of norms of 
international law outlawing economic coercion whose source is custom 
or other authority besides the World Bank's constituent treaties. The book 
strongly criticizes the assumption that "unilateral economic coercion 
(initiated by one sender state acting alone) cannot be exercised through 
institutions such as the multilateral development banks."43 Rather, the 
author asserts that the multilateral institution of the Bank itself can engage 
in proscribed unilateral coercion, as distinct from the direct exercise of 
39. /d. at 169. 
40. /d. at 235. 
41. /d. 
42. /d. 
43. /d. at 10. 
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suasion between Bank member countries through bilateral channels such 
as foreign assistance provided by a single donor State. The work's 
analysis, which concludes that unilateral economic coercion can occur 
through the exercise of power or the abuse of rights in an attempt to 
influence the policies of a multilateral forum like the World Bank, should 
be extremely controversial. 
Loan agreements between the Bank and borrowing countries have a 
status in international law similar to that of treaties.44 As suggested by this 
characterization, the critical element of consent is fundamental to the 
relationship between the Bank and the borrower. Lending proposals must 
be agreed by the professional staff and the borrowing country government 
before presentation to the Board of Executive Directors for subsequent 
approval. Bank staff may refuse to pursue negotiations on a loan proposal, 
or negotiations between the borrowing country government and the Bank 
may break down. Although at the negotiation stage there may ·be some 
potential for "politicization" as described in this book, the Bank's 
professional staff is not under the direct, day-to-day control of the Board 
of Executive DirectQrs. Even at the Board level, a member country can 
hardly be said to have a legally identifiable right to a particular loan, 
because loan proposals must be approved by the Board. 
Alternatively, World Bank member States might have a legal right, 
whose source is the Bank's Articles of Agreement, to an "impartial[]" 
decision-making process in which "[o]nly economic considerations shall 
be relevant."45 But even then, an aggrieved Bank member State could 
terminate all "coercion" by merely discontinuing further discussions with 
Bank staff. The author cites no primary authority that suggests the 
contrary. While norms of international law that might govern the exercise 
of unequal bargaining power in a consensual setting could have some 
relevance in this context, the author does not allude to any such principles. 
Norms governing duress or coercion that might invalidate a treaty under 
international law generally demand a considerably higher threshold 
involving the threat of or actual use of force.46 The author understandably 
44. See Lester Nurick, Certain Aspects of the Law and Practice of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 
100, 127 (Stephen M. Schwebel ed., 1971) (statement by World Bank Deputy Ge_neral Counsel). 
45. IBRD Articles of Agreement, .~upra note 4, art. IV,§ 10, 60 Stat. at 1449, 2 U.N.T.S. 
at 158; IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. V, § 6, 11 U.S.T. at 2294,439 U.N.T.S. 
at 266-68. See supra note 6 and acc.ompanying text. 
46. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 52, S. ExEc. 
Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 
(1969) ("A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in 
violation of the principles of internationa1law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."). 
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and correctly does not characterize negotiations between the Bank and its 
borrowing members as rising to the level of threat of force or actual force. 
In discussing a series of negative Board votes by the United States 
motivated by concern for India's nuclear policy, the author acknowledges 
the weaknesses in his reasoning. "[W]ithout the support of other [World 
Bank] members," he observes, those votes "could not actually affect the 
rights of India within the IDA"47 and were of "purely symbolic" sig-
nificance.48 Presumably for this reason, after conceding that "it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that any conditions placed upon bilateral aid by the 
donor are voluntarily consented to by the recipient,"49 the author devotes 
a scant three pages to the legality of influencing recipient countries 
through the channel of development assistance, citing only one marginally 
persuasive interpretive reference and no primary sources. While the 
treatment of bilateral aid is thin, the author provides no authority what-
soever for the proposition that lending provided through multilateral 
·channels like the World Bank has violated customary norms of internation-
al law. 
In any event, it is far from clear that a single State - even a country 
like the United States operating in a weighted decision-making context, 
but still with less than one-fifth of the voting power in the World Bank 
- could be said to be exercising prohibited unilateral pressure in a 
multilateral setting. The only actions with legal effect in the multilateral 
institution are those taken by the Bank itself, acting through its prescribed 
constitutional processes, ·and not those of individual members. Even the 
five largest donors to the Bank acting in concert could not by themselves 
assure that a particular loan proposal would be disapproved. Such a level 
of agreement would arguably qualify as a legally significant pattern of 
behavior. With that levef of consensus, moreover, the Bank's Board of 
Executive Directors could formally render a definitive interpretation of the 
institution's constituent treaties. 50 
The author admits as much by rejecting a rigidly textual interpretation 
of the Bank's Articles of Agreement based strictly on the original intent 
of the drafters in favor of an "evolving, dynamic"5 t view of the World 
47. BROWN, supra note I, at 26. 
48. /d. at 25-26. 
49. /d. at 84. 
50. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. IX(a), 60 Stat. at 1460, 2 U.N.T.S. at 
186 ("Any question of interpretation of this Agreement arising between any member and the 
Bank or between any members of the Bank shall be submitted to the Executive Directors for 
their decision."); see also IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. X( a), II U.S.T. at 2308, 
439 U.N.T.S. at 288 (same). 
51. BROWN, supra note I, at 99. 
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Bank as responsive to changing needs. Indeed, it is precisely this tension 
between the Bank's narrowly circumscribed economic mission on the one 
hand and the imperative to operate in larger contextual settings on the 
other that gives rise to the central dilemma identified, but hardly resolved, 
in this book. 
The question of the legality of conditions on development assistance 
is of far more than just theoretical concern. The Bank's borrowing 
countries have on occasion objected to environmental conditions in loan 
agreements not as ill-judged exercise of Bank staffs considerable discre-
tion or even as departures from the Bank's Articles of Agreement. Instead, 
so-called "green conditionality" has been attacked as an outright violation 
of sovereignty that implies an infringement of the exclusive prerogative 
of borrowing States to govern within their territories. 52 These grossly 
overstated objections go well beyond those in this book. Nonetheless, 
those complaints demonstrate the potential for the author's flawed analysis 
to undermine, rather than to enhance, the Bank's capacity to fulfill its 
mission of encouraging the adoption of"constructive" policies in develop-
ing countries.53 By mistakenly asserting that the actions of the Bank as an 
institution could violate customary norms proscribing unilateral economic 
coercion, this book's approach may well impede realization of "the need 
for evolutionary development in [the Bank's] mandate"54 identified by the 
author himself. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States and the Politicization of the World Bank addresses 
a question that has assumed great importance in both practice and 
principle. Overall, the book is a very thoughtful and meticulous effort that 
codifies, elaborates, and · embellishes a straightforward, mainstream 
approach to the World Bank as an institution. The author takes the Bank's 
principal legal authorities at face value, largely accepts the institution's 
interpretation of those instruments, and carries his analysis about as far 
as possible within those confines. The case studies are carefully docu-
mented and dissected, with copious references to primary materials. This 
work appears to contain the first published inventory and evaluation of 
U.S. legislation intended to influence the World Bank and the U.S. posture 
within that international financial institution. Additionally, the book 
contains an extensive bibliography and a mildly helpful index. 
52. See, e.g., World Bank: Greener Faces for Its Greenbacks, EcoNOMIST, Sept. 2, 1989, 
at 41. 
53. BROWN, supra note 1, at 237. 
54. /d. 
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But in the end, the author provides little insight into the task he sets 
out for himself: establishing legal standards for "politicization." Ironically, 
the book is most successful in exposing the limits of legal analysis and 
the need to consider alternative points of view. Unfortunately, the author 
never resolves the contradictions he himself identifies. The problem is that, 
depending on the context and the perspective of the observer, broad gauge 
social and human welfare issues like environment and human rights may 
be political, economic, neither, or both, with no clear demarcation between 
categories. Even Bank staff has difficulty in making these distinctions with 
precision, and the calculus may also change over time. The complexity 
of distinguishing in a legally meaningful way between actions that have 
a genuine economic justification and those for which an economic 
rationale is a mere pretext may exacerbate rather than ameliorate difficul-
ties in particular concrete situations like the case studies fastidiously docu-
mented in this book. 
Even if the book was successful in its goal, the application of legal 
standards to the actions of Bank member countries and the institution's 
professional staff might ultimately be a pointless exercise, unless the 
underlying causes of "politicization" are identified and addressed. Although 
the author observes that "[p ]oliticization is often said to be increasing,''55 
there is little reason to believe that a legal examination of the question will 
necessarily affect the behavior of sovereign States presently inclined toward 
"politicization" in the exercise of their rights and privileges in a highly 
discretionary, evolving, and dynamic setting. The temptation to attempt 
to free international institutions from political constraints, as advocated 
by the author of this book, is very great. However, the book ultimately 
provides only a limited and unsatisfying prescription for assuring that such 
an approach will operate effectively in the face of rampant "politicization." 
At the most fundamental level, the book's unsuccessful attempt to grapple 
with its central task demonstrates the need for an alternative to apolitical, 
functional theories of international organization. The example of the World 
Bank further highlights the potentially high costs in terms of democratic 
accountability if technocratic institutions are insulated from political 
controls. In the end, it may be that "politicization" is not all bad, but may, 
at least in some cases, serve as a necessary check on the concentration of 
power in international bureaucratic elites. 
55. /d. at 13. 
